Abstract :
In this article, I argue that lawmakers must abandon their previousreluctance to engage with questions of personal identity (PI). While frequently seenas an esoteric subject, of limited interest outside of academic philosophy departments, I attempt to show that, in fact, assumptions about PI—and its durability in theface of certain psychological or genetic changes—underpin many current legal rules. This is most perhaps obviously exemplified with regard to reproductive technologies. Yet the Parfitian challenge to identify a victim of ‘bad’ reproductive choiceshas been largely overlooked in framing legislative responses to such technologies.Furthermore, I argue, it is not only with regard to emerging technologies thatquestionable assumptions about PI play a role; legal responses to questions about theattribution of criminal responsibility, and about the treatment of demented or braininjuredpeople, necessitate a frank engagement with such questions. It may be, however, that a multi-faceted approach to PI, which takes account of genetic psychological and social factors—will prove a better fit for the myriad needs of thelegal system than any sort of ‘unified theory of identity
