Abstract :
The relationship between pluralism and liberalism has been at the center of recent considerations of Isaiah Berlinʹs thought. In particular, liberal theorists have asked whether the value pluralism Berlin endorses actually undermines his liberalism. A common interpretive approach resolves this problem by presenting Berlinʹs pluralism as "limited" rather than "radical," and therefore capable of serving as a moral foundation authorizing liberalism. I challenge this re-construction of Berlinʹs work, arguing that such readings are premised on a conception of judgment Berlin does not share. While many of his readers believe that a judgment on behalf of liberalism requires the identification of a transcontextual ground, Berlin invites us to see human judgment as a meaningful practice that occurs in the absence of absolutes yet does not simply mirror local norms. Berlinʹs defense of liberalism models this kind of judgment—a judgment that is neither mandated, nor ruled out, by pluralism.
