Title of article :
Exploring agency problems in corporate governance from the perspective of economic ethics of the capitalist market
Author/Authors :
Hsiang-Yi Lin، نويسنده , , Chih-Wen Huang، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
Abstract :
Moral hazard is reflected in the information asymmetry between the agent and the principal, as well as under the assumption that humans are egotistic with limited rationality, often risk-averse and antagonistic towards each otherʹs goals. The agent could thus hide the truth from the principal, not abide by their mutual agreement, and tamper with the investment objectives and plans. From the perspective of Taiwanʹs external market mechanisms to corporate governance, shareholders (principals) can exploit situations such as poor sales of company products or corporate managers failing to yield satisfactory performance, etc., to monitor and keep the managerial hierarchy (agents) in check through capital market and corporate control market. A practical way to avoid such moral hazard is for the agents to follow the Golden Rule advocated by Hans Kung "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you", and to live up to the ethical principle of "commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness". Relatively, the agency costs required by other methods to reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard problems seem comparatively higher than the former.
Keywords :
Corporate Governance , Business ethics , moral hazard information asymmetry , agency problem , economic ethics of the capitalist market
Journal title :
African Journal of Business Management
Journal title :
African Journal of Business Management