Title of article
RESIDUAL WAGE DISPARITY AND COORDINATION UNEMPLOYMENT∗
Author/Authors
Benoît Julien، نويسنده , , John Kennes، نويسنده , , AND IAN KING1، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006
Pages
29
From page
961
To page
989
Abstract
How much of residual wage dispersion can be explained by an absence of
coordination among firms? To answer, we construct a dynamic directed search
model with identical workers where firms can create high- or low-productivity jobs
and are uncoordinated in their offers to workers, calibrated to the U.S. economy.
Workers can exploit ex post opportunities once approached by firms, and can
conduct on-the-job search. The stationary equilibrium wage distribution is humpshaped,
skewed significantly to the right, and, with baseline parameters, generates
residual dispersion statistics 75–90% of those found empirically. However, the
model underestimates the average duration of unemployment.
Journal title
International Economic Review
Serial Year
2006
Journal title
International Economic Review
Record number
707506
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