Abstract :
For the past four decades, debate has occurred in respect of situational social psychology
and virtue ethics. This paper attempts to reconcile this debate. Situationists propose a
fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of dispositions, each of
which has a restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of
character (behaviour is regulated by long-term dispositions). In order to support this view,
they cite a number of experiments. It is proposed that the substantive claims made by
situationist social psychologists, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an
Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stem from a misunderstanding of concepts of
moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations in respect of experimental results.
Situationists take a narrow view of character and morality. Evidence from organizational
behaviour and managerial research literature supports the view that both situational
(organizational) features and inner characteristics (including virtues) are powerful influences
and determinants of morally upright and morally deviant behaviour. The role of practical
judgement in bridging these views is discussed. As a way forward in reconciling situational
social psychology with virtue ethics, the paper proposes an Aristotelian–Thomistic
framework to overcome some of the problems associated with inadequate regulative ideals
in building a normative moral theory.
