Abstract :
Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism,
this paper argues for the following thesis: Assume a theory T has been empirically
successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior
theory T∗, which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical
superstructure. Then under natural conditionsTcontains certain theoretical expressions,
which yielded T’s empirical success, such that these T-expressions correspond (in A) to
certain theoretical expressions of T∗, and given T∗ is true, they refer indirectly to the
entities denoted by these expressions of T∗. The thesis is first motivated by a study of the
phlogiston–oxygen example. Then the thesis is proved in the form of a logical theorem,
and illustrated by further examples. The final sections explain how the correspondence
theorem justifies scientific realism andwork out the advantages of the suggested account.
