• Title of article

    Politics and the Fed

  • Author/Authors

    Allan H. Meltzer، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    10
  • From page
    39
  • To page
    48
  • Abstract
    In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences.
  • Journal title
    Journal monetary economics
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    Journal monetary economics
  • Record number

    713607