State Building and Transitional Politics in Iraq: The Perils of a Top-down Transition

This article examines Iraq’s transitional politics from June 2003 to the Constitutional Referendum of October 2005. It argues that the topdown political transition led by the United States and a narrow group of Iraqi elites was inappropriate for the task of reforming the Iraqi state and building democratic institutions. The article argues that, in countries going through regime change while also radically reforming the state, inclusive transitional institutions and consultative processes contribute to agreements being reached about the future of the state. Such transitions allow actors to guarantee the continued participation of opponents in the political process and to gradually develop agreements on constitutional questions. This did not occur in Iraq. An inclusive political process and a national debate on the country’s future did not occur. Rather, a narrow group of political elites led the transitional process in the absence of wide consultations. The article argues that the management of Iraq’s transition had an independent impact on the outcome of the transition, namely the failure to reach agreement on the sharing of political and economic power within one state by October 2005.