Title of article :
Sovereigndebtauctions:Uniformordiscriminatory?
Author/Authors :
Menachem Brenner، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Abstract :
Manyfinancialassets,especiallygovernmentbonds,areissuedbyanauction.An
importantfeatureofthedesignistheauctionpricingmechanism:uniformversus
discriminatory.Theoreticalpapersdonotprovideadefiniteanswerregardingthe
dominanceofonetypeofauctionovertheother.Weinvestigatetherevealed
preferences oftheissuersbysurveyingthesovereignissuersthatconductauctions.
Wefindthatthemajorityoftheissuers/countriesinoursampleuseadiscriminatory
auction mechanismforissuinggovernmentdebt.Weuseamultinomiallogitprocedure
and discriminatoryanalysistoinvestigatethemechanismchoice.Itwasinterestingto
find thatmarket-orientedeconomiesandthosethatpracticecommonlawtendtousea
uniform methodwhileeconomieswhoarelessmarketorientedandpracticecivillaw
tend tousediscriminatorypriceauctions
Keywords :
UniformauctionDiscriminatory auctionTreasurybondsT-bills
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
