Title of article :
Bankingpanicsandpolicyresponses
Author/Authors :
Huberto M.Ennis، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Abstract :
When policymakershavelimitedcommitmentpower,self-fulfillingbankrunscanarise
as anequilibriumphenomenon.Westudyhowsuchbankingpanicsunfoldinaversion
of the DiamondandDybvig(1983) model. Aruninthissettingisnecessarilypartial,
with onlysomedepositorsparticipating.Inaddition,arunnaturallyoccursinwaves,
with eachwaveofwithdrawalspromptingafurtherresponsefrompolicymakers.In
thisway,theinterplaybetweentheactionsofdepositorsandtheresponsesofpolicy
makersshapesthecourseofacrisis.
Keywords :
Bank runsLimited commitmentTime consistencySuspension ofconvertibility
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
