Title of article
One ortwomonies?$
Author/Authors
Mei Dong، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages
12
From page
439
To page
450
Abstract
The setofincentive-feasibleallocationsisexaminedinadynamicquasi-linear
environmentwhereagentslackcommitmentandhaveprivateinformationovertheir
idiosyncraticcharacteristics.Whenrecord-keepingisavailable,thefirst-bestallocation
is implementableinasetofsufficientlypatienteconomies.Whenrecord-keepingis
limited toonemoney,thissetisstrictlysmaller—exceptwhenprivateinformationis
absent.Whenrecord-keepingisexpanded,butlimitedtotwomonies,thesetof
economiesforwhichthefirst-bestisimplementablecorrespondstothatofrecord-
keeping,evenwhenprivateinformationispresent.Wefurtherdemonstratethattwo
moniesareaperfectsubstituteforrecord-keeping
Keywords
Record-keepingMoneyPrivate informationLimited commitmentMechanism design
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year
2010
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number
846403
Link To Document