Abstract :
If government is confronted with “latent time bombs”—potentially major, sudden disasters such as earthquakes, droughts, floods, or financial collapse—when will it react? This exploratory studyʹs hypothesis is that government is more likely to address threats after they actually occur, rather than before they might occur, i.e., the propensity is not to intervene. This is counter to the observed propensity of governments to intervene against the perceived threats posed by nonsudden environmental risks, e.g., hazardous substances. This study contrasts governmentʹs differing responses to latent time bombs and hazardous substances. It attributes the difference in response to the differing visibility of intervention costs and the differing distribution of these costs. In the case of hazardous substances, the propensity to intervene may be accounted for by the availability of an intervention mode, i.e., regulation, whose costs are difficult to discern and are spread thinly over the entire population. The hypothesis is explored with the help of three case studies of confronting latent time bombs in Israel.
