• Title of article

    A review of the role and remit of the committee on climate change

  • Author/Authors

    Peter G. McGregor، نويسنده , , J. Kim Swales، نويسنده , , Matthew A. Winning، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
  • Pages
    8
  • From page
    466
  • To page
    473
  • Abstract
    Domestic action on climate change requires a combination of solutions, in terms of institutions and policy instruments. One way of achieving government carbon policy goals may be the creation of an independent body to advise on, or set, monitor policy. This paper critically assesses the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which was created in 2008 as an independent body to help move the UK towards a low-carbon economy. We look at the motivation for its creation. In particular we consider its ability to overcome a time-inconsistency problem by comparing it to another independent body, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. In practice the CCC appears to be the “inverse” of the Monetary Policy Committee, in that it advises on what the policy goal should be rather than being held responsible for achieving it. The CCC incorporates both advisory and monitoring functions to inform government and achieve a credible carbon policy over a long time frame. This is a similar framework to that adopted by Stern (2006), but the CCC operates on a continuing basis and also incorporates a unique climate change monitoring function.
  • Keywords
    Independent body , Climate change , Time-inconsistency
  • Journal title
    Energy Policy
  • Serial Year
    2012
  • Journal title
    Energy Policy
  • Record number

    973638