شماره ركورد :
50799
عنوان مقاله :
تحليل استراتيجيات الموسسات في المنافسة بواسطة الكميات المتجانسة باستعمال نظرية الالعاب - المقارنة بين توازنات: كورنو، ستاكلبيرغ، و كارتل الكمية-
پديد آورندگان :
محمد, بن مريم جامعة حسيبة بن بوعلي - كلية العلوم الاقتصادية والتجارية وعلوم التسيير, الجزائر
از صفحه :
89
تا صفحه :
118
تعداد صفحه :
30
چكيده عربي :
فاقد چكيده
چكيده لاتين :
This study aims to identify the most important methods of Theory of Games used in analyzing the strategies of the Firms that work in oligopolistic conditions (duopoly as a special case) in the existence of goods and services homogeneous where Firms focus on the size of supply only as a decision variable, and that is through displaying the various models (Cournot, Stackelberg, and cartel quantity), each of which assume a certain economic behavior for Firms that work under these market conditions. The most important results that have been reached are as the following: - generally the difference in the solutions (equilibrium) of these models due to the considerations that are related to the type of behavior (cooperative and non-cooperative), as well as the sort order or the time of the firms moves.-Time & costs represent the strategic role in this type of competition, if the firms are heterogeneous, then it is the firm's interest that be dominant by costs and time, where the firm's dominant by costs be in the best position in the Cournot’s model, and the dominant by time in the Stackelberg’s model. - But if the firms are homogeneous, in this case be in their interest to form the Cartel instead of competition to maximize their profits. on the other hand, the firm can increase profits if it violated the agreements of the cartel unilateral only, but in return it will get the lowest possible profit if all Cartel parties broken their agreements at the same time
كليدواژه :
Theory of Games , model of Cournot , Stackelberg model , cartel model , Cournot-Nash equilibrium , Stackelberg equilibrium
سال انتشار :
2014
عنوان نشريه :
اقتصاديات شمال افريقيا
لينک به اين مدرک :
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