المخاطر الاخلاقية في المصارف الاسلامية: دراسة تطبيقية على عقود المشاركات

Moral Risks in Islamic Banks: An Applied Study on Partnership Contracts

The study aims to examine the moral hazards facing Islamic banks because of customer's negligence or dishonesty in Participation contracts in the possibility of partner cheating because of the honesty entrusted to him (Partner = Honest Agent with trustworthy hands). It becomes evident in lying about the real amount of profit or full or partial loss claim, counterfeiting accounts and lack of transparency and clarity to hide exact data that should be shown to the financier partner, which leads the Islamic banks to adopt Debt contract at the expense of Participation contracts. The Study addresses the problem of customer's negligence or dishonesty in Participations contracts in terms of transferring responsibility for proof from the bank to the customer because the of Bank's inability for proof and inexperience in each business details. If the customer denies dishonesty and negligence and proves exerting proper action, the Islamic banks will be encouraged to continue to provide financing and expansion of participation. The Study found that moral hazards lead to reduce the size of investment in Participation contracts, and shifting the proof related to negligence or dishonesty from the bank to the customer will reduce moral hazards and increase the size of investment in Participation contracts.