ÖZTÜRK, Ali Bilge Akdeniz Üniversitesi - Edebiyat Fakültesi - Felsefe Bölümü, Turkey

On Michael Devitt’s Empiricism

22476

Michael Devitt, in his several articles, defended the empiricist view that there is no a priori justification or that this concept bears no philosophical significance by attempting to demonstrate that it is a desperately obscure term and there is no need to this concept (even in epistemology, logic and mathematics) if the nature of epistemic justification is viewed in naturalistic and holistic ways. In this study it is argued that Devitt’s argument fails due to the fact that a same kind of desperate obscurity argument may be raised also against the concept of empirical justification and its role in epistemological, logical and mathematical inquiry. And if it is right obscurity arguments may not have a decisive role in the a priorism/empiricism debate.

243

A priori justification , empirical justification , philosophical intuitions , logical rules , laws of mathematics

Mediterranean Journal Of Humanities

260