Author/Authors
Robinson، نويسنده , , Elizabeth J.Z. and Albers، نويسنده , , Heidi J. and Ngeleza، نويسنده , , Guyslain and Lokina، نويسنده , , Razack B.، نويسنده ,
DocumentNumber
3543405
Title Of Article
Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania
شماره ركورد
2546
Latin Abstract
In low-income countries, both nearby local villagers, “insiders”, and non-locals, “outsiders”, extract products from protected forests even though their actions are illegal. Forest managers typically combine enforcement and livelihood projects offered to nearby communities to reduce this illegal activity, but with limited budgets cannot deter all extraction. We develop a game theoretic model of a forest managerʹs decision interacting with the extraction decisions of insiders and outsiders. Our analysis suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may reduce total forest degradation by legalizing “insider” extraction in return for local villagersʹ involvement in enforcement activities against outsiders.
From Page
242
NaturalLanguageKeyword
Energy , Tanzania , Charcoal production , enforcement , non-timber forest products , Bee keeping , Livelihood projects , Participatory forest management
JournalTitle
Studia Iranica
To Page
248
To Page
248
Link To Document