Author/Authors
ÇİTÇİ, Sadettin Haluk Gebze Yüksek Teknoloji Enstitüsü - İşletme Fakültesi - İktisat Bölümü, Turkey
Title Of Article
Agency and Transparency in Financial Markets
شماره ركورد
25728
Abstract
We analyze incentive effects of transparency on delegated portfolio management. When portfolio return is observable, disclosure of portfolio composition decreases expected return and lowers the investor s ability to identify the manager s actual type. More information about the portfolio return before renewal of management agreement also decreases expected return, while, conditionally, it may provide more information about manager s actual ability.
From Page
269
NaturalLanguageKeyword
transparency , career concern , delegated portfolio management
JournalTitle
Journal Of Management and Economics
To Page
280
JournalTitle
Journal Of Management and Economics
Link To Document