Author/Authors :
Hasson، نويسنده , , Reviva and Lِfgren، نويسنده , , إsa and Visser، نويسنده , , Martine، نويسنده ,
DocumentNumber :
3541400
Title Of Article :
Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation
شماره ركورد :
3097
Latin Abstract :
We use behavioral and experimental economics to study a particular aspect of the economics of climate change: the potential trade-off between countriesʹ investments in mitigation versus adaptation. While mitigation of greenhouse gases can be viewed as a public good, adaptation to climate change is a private good, benefiting only the country or the individual that invests in adaptation. We use a one-shot public-goods game that deviates from the standard public-goods game by introducing a stochastic term to account for probabilistic destruction in a climate-change setting, where the probability density function is mapped to within-group levels of mitigation. We compare low-vulnerability and high-vulnerability treatments by varying the magnitude of disaster across treatments. Our results show that there is no significant difference in the level of mitigation across these treatments. Further, our results emphasize the role of trust in enhancing cooperation.
From Page :
331
NaturalLanguageKeyword :
climate change , Public good , mitigation , Adaptation , Experiment , Risk
JournalTitle :
Studia Iranica
To Page :
338
To Page :
338
Link To Document :
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