Author/Authors :
Eva Camacho-Cuena، نويسنده , , Eva and Requate، نويسنده , , Till، نويسنده ,
Title Of Article :
The regulation of non-point source pollution and risk preferences: An experimental approach
Latin Abstract :
Many environmental problems, notably arising from agriculture, can be classified as non-point source pollution problems. In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the performance of three mechanisms designed to deal with such problems: collective fining, random fining, and a tax-subsidy scheme. We find that the fining schemes induce under-abatement, a feature being enforced with experience. We further elicit the participantsʹ risk attitude and show that the performance of collective fining is not affected by the subjectsʹ risk preferences. Under a system based on random fining the performance of the mechanism worsens in the presence of risk seeking subjects. However, coordination on over-abatement under the tax-subsidy can be alleviated if subjects are risk averse.
NaturalLanguageKeyword :
Risk attitude , environmental policy , Non-point source pollution , Economic experiments
JournalTitle :
Studia Iranica
