Cooperative resource allocation games in shared networks: symmetric and asymmetric fair bargaining models

The high cost associated with the rollout of 3G services encourages operators to share network infrastructure. Network sharing poses a new challenge in devising fair and Pareto optimal resource allocation strategies to distribute system resources among users and operators in the network. Cooperative game theory provides a framework for formulating such strategies. In this paper, we propose two models (i.e. symmetric and asymmetric) for cooperative resource bargaining among the users and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) of each operator in shared networks based on the concept of preference functions. The bargaining solutions proposed vary according to a parameter beta that considers the tradeoff between one´s gain and the losses of others. The well-known Nash and Raiffa- Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions are special instances of the solutions proposed. The symmetric model assumes that all players have equal bargaining powers while in the asymmetric case, players are allowed to submit bids to the network operator to influence the final bargaining outcome. Due to the diversity of demand patterns, temporary resource exchange among operators can provide benefits in terms of better communication quality to their users. To avoid selfish behaviour of the operators, we propose a resource sharing model that allocates extra resources based on the past allocations and contributions of each operator.