• DocumentCode
    1077642
  • Title

    VCG-Kelly Mechanisms for Allocation of Divisible Goods: Adapting VCG Mechanisms to One-Dimensional Signals

  • Author

    Yang, Sichao ; Hajek, Bruce

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Electr. & Comput. Eng., Univ. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL
  • Volume
    25
  • Issue
    6
  • fYear
    2007
  • fDate
    8/1/2007 12:00:00 AM
  • Firstpage
    1237
  • Lastpage
    1243
  • Abstract
    rdquoThe VCG-Kelly mechanism is proposed, which is obtained by composing the communication efficient, one- dimensional signaling idea of Kelly with the VCG mechanism, providing efficient allocation for strategic buyers at Nash equilibrium points. It is shown that the revenue to the seller can be maximized or minimized using a particular one-dimensional family of surrogate valuation functions.
  • Keywords
    resource allocation; telecommunication network planning; telecommunication network routing; telecommunication network topology; 1D signals signaling; Nash equilibrium points; VCG-Kelly mechanisms; communication efficient; divisible goods allocation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Selected Areas in Communications, IEEE Journal on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    0733-8716
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/JSAC.2007.070817
  • Filename
    4278423
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=1077642