Bad data injection in smart grid: attack and defense mechanisms

In modern smart grid networks, the traditional power grid is empowered by technological advances in sensing, measurement, and control devices with two-way communications between the suppliers and consumers. The smart grid integration helps the power grid networks to be smarter, but it also increases the risk of attacks because of the existing obsolete cyber-infrastructure. In this article, we focus on bad data injection attacks for smart grid. The basic problem formulation is presented, and the special type of stealth attack is discussed. Then we investigate the strategies of defenders and attackers, respectively. Specifically, from the defender´s perspective, an adaptive cumulative sum test is able to determine the possible existence of adversaries at the control center as quickly as possible. From the attacker´s point of view, independent component analysis is employed for the attackers to make inferences through phasor observations without prior knowledge of the power grid topology. The inferred structural information can then be used to launch stealth attacks.