DocumentCode
1121494
Title
On the Distinguishability of Distance-Bounded Permutations in Ordered Channels
Author
Tapiador, Juan M Estevez ; Hernandez-Castro, Julio C. ; Alcaide, Almudena ; Ribagorda, Arturo
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Carlos III Univ. of Madrid, Madrid
Volume
3
Issue
2
fYear
2008
fDate
6/1/2008 12:00:00 AM
Firstpage
166
Lastpage
172
Abstract
Ordered channels, such as those provided by Internet protocol and transmission control protocol protocols, rely on sequence numbers to recover from packet reordering due to network dynamics. The existence of covert channels in any ordered channel is a well-known fact: Two parties can reorder the elements (packets) to be sent according to some predefined code. Schemes based on distance-bounded permutations have been proposed for steganographic communication with the aim of keeping and controling the increase of latency due to reordering. In this paper, we demonstrate that distance-bounded permutations are highly anomalous from a metric point of view. Our analysis is based on the study of the distribution of distances between normal permutations generated by the channel, and those produced when embedding hidden information. We provide results for four different distances: Kendall´s tau, Spearman´s rho, Spearman´s footrule, and Levenshtein´s distance (which is equivalent to Ulam´s distance for permutations). In all cases, it is shown how sequences with hidden information can be separated from the normal ones. As a result, very accurate and efficient distinguishers can be easily constructed. Finally, we study the detection capabilities of the associated detectors through a receiver operating characteristic analysis.
Keywords
cryptography; data encapsulation; transport protocols; Internet protocol; distance-bounded permutations; ordered channels; steganalysis; steganographic communication; transmission control protocol; Distances on permutations; ordered channels; steganalysis; steganography;
fLanguage
English
Journal_Title
Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher
ieee
ISSN
1556-6013
Type
jour
DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2008.920724
Filename
4483521
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