• DocumentCode
    120058
  • Title

    Game Analysis on Rent-Seeking Behavior of Three Participants in Overseas Engineering Project

  • Author

    Yong Wang ; Hao Ding ; Yu Xiao

  • Author_Institution
    Sch. of Econ. & Manage., China Univ. of Pet., Qingdao, China
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    4-6 July 2014
  • Firstpage
    79
  • Lastpage
    82
  • Abstract
    In order to reduce the loss of owner due to the rent-seeking behavior of construction and supervisor in overseas engineering projects, the paper explored the game relationship of the three parties involved by using game theory. The paper founded tripartite game payoff matrix and analyzed Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy game. The results show that, with the increasing probability of the inspection success of owner, the probability of the rent-seeking of construction side is decreased. So does the probability of accepting the rent-seeking of supervisor side. And probability that the supervision side accepts the rent-seeking also promotes the probability of the checking success of owner. For the owner, it is an effective way to reduce interest damage by strengthening the construction of their own team and building effective and perfect incentive mechanism and punishment mechanism.
  • Keywords
    game theory; globalisation; matrix algebra; probability; project management; Nash equilibrium; construction side; game analysis; game relationship; game theory; incentive mechanism; interest damage reduction; mixed strategy game; overseas engineering projects; owner checking success; owner inspection success; owner loss reduction; probability; punishment mechanism; rent-seeking behavior; supervisor side; tripartite game payoff matrix; Companies; Economics; Educational institutions; Game theory; Games; Inspection; Petroleum; Game Theory; Overseas engineering projects; Rent-seeking;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO), 2014 Seventh International Joint Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-5371-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSO.2014.24
  • Filename
    6923640