DocumentCode :
120120
Title :
Incentive Constraint Mechanism for Senior Executives of Village Bank
Author :
Huiling Wang ; Qiongyu Yang
Author_Institution :
Sch. of Finance & Trade, Chongqing City Manage. Coll., Chongqing, China
fYear :
2014
fDate :
4-6 July 2014
Firstpage :
208
Lastpage :
212
Abstract :
In order to support the new rural construction and solve the problems of China´s rural financial market, China Banking Regulatory Commission lowered the rural financial institutions admittance threshold in 2006 and set up many new-type rural financial institutions, so village banks come into being. However, the village banks didn´t operate as well as expected in practice. Starting from the incentive constraint mechanism along with introducing reputation mechanism, this paper studied Incentive restraint mechanism for senior executives of village banks and analyzed the operation effect arising thereof. At last, this paper provides the corresponding policy suggestions.
Keywords :
banking; incentive schemes; utility theory; China Banking Regulatory Commission; China rural financial market; incentive constraint mechanism; incentive restraint mechanism; operation effect analysis; reputation mechanism; rural construction; rural financial institution admittance threshold; senior executives; village bank; Banking; Cities and towns; Economics; Finance; Games; Law;
fLanguage :
English
Publisher :
ieee
Conference_Titel :
Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO), 2014 Seventh International Joint Conference on
Conference_Location :
Beijing
Print_ISBN :
978-1-4799-5371-4
Type :
conf
DOI :
10.1109/CSO.2014.145
Filename :
6923670
Link To Document :
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