• DocumentCode
    120206
  • Title

    Vertical Structure Choice of Multi-Supply Chains Competition

  • Author

    Yao Fengmin ; Tong Qingtian ; Xu Subo ; Teng Chunxian

  • Author_Institution
    Inst. of Syst. Eng., Harbin Univ. of Sci. & Technol., Harbin, China
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    4-6 July 2014
  • Firstpage
    409
  • Lastpage
    413
  • Abstract
    This paper focuses on the vertical structure choice of multi-supply chains competition. By controlling the number of integrated and decentralized supply chains, we discuss the Nash equilibrium under hybrid scenario, and show that when the market share of each supply chain is less than the average, a appropriate competition is benefit to increase the supply chain profit, but with the strength of competition, the supply chain profit trends to decrease. Further, we compare the industry profit of competitive supply chains under three different scenario, and find the intensity of product competition will impact on the equilibrium structure of the supply chains when each of supply chains has the same market share. However, when the intensity of competition is fierce, the pure decentralized supply chain structure will be better than that pure integrated structure, the hybrid structure whether dominate depends on the number of integrated and decentralized supply chains.
  • Keywords
    game theory; supply chain management; Nash equilibrium; decentralized supply chains; hybrid structure; industry profit; integrated supply chains; multisupply chain competition; product competition intensity; supply chain equilibrium structure; supply chain profit; vertical structure choice; Computers; Educational institutions; Industries; Nash equilibrium; Supply chains; Switches; Systems engineering and theory; hybrid scenario; multi-supply chains competition; nash equilibrium; vertical structure choice;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computational Sciences and Optimization (CSO), 2014 Seventh International Joint Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    Beijing
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4799-5371-4
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CSO.2014.85
  • Filename
    6923714