DocumentCode
120773
Title
The resolution of failing banks: Bail-out or bail-in?
Author
Goodhart, C.
Author_Institution
Financial Markets Group, London Sch. of Econ., London, UK
fYear
2014
fDate
27-28 March 2014
Abstract
Summary form only given. Prior to the Lehman failure, most large failing banks were rescued by an encouraged merger with a stronger bank. That route has now become more difficult. Because of the dangers of liquidating any large bank, the aim will be to recapitalise them. In the past this has been done by bail-out. This has led to many objections, on grounds of moral hazard, unfairness to taxpayers, and leading to a sovereign/bank `doom-loop´. So there is a drive to shift the burden of recapitalisation onto creditors, i.e. bail-in. But this, too, will have numerous problems, several of which have not (yet) been fully appreciated.
Keywords
banking; corporate acquisitions; credit transactions; bail-in; bail-out; bank doom-loop; creditors; failing bank resolution; merger; recapitalisation; Abstracts; Banking; Corporate acquisitions; Economics; Educational institutions; Finance; History;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering & Economics (CIFEr), 2104 IEEE Conference on
Conference_Location
London
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CIFEr.2014.6924045
Filename
6924045
Link To Document