• DocumentCode
    120773
  • Title

    The resolution of failing banks: Bail-out or bail-in?

  • Author

    Goodhart, C.

  • Author_Institution
    Financial Markets Group, London Sch. of Econ., London, UK
  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    27-28 March 2014
  • Abstract
    Summary form only given. Prior to the Lehman failure, most large failing banks were rescued by an encouraged merger with a stronger bank. That route has now become more difficult. Because of the dangers of liquidating any large bank, the aim will be to recapitalise them. In the past this has been done by bail-out. This has led to many objections, on grounds of moral hazard, unfairness to taxpayers, and leading to a sovereign/bank `doom-loop´. So there is a drive to shift the burden of recapitalisation onto creditors, i.e. bail-in. But this, too, will have numerous problems, several of which have not (yet) been fully appreciated.
  • Keywords
    banking; corporate acquisitions; credit transactions; bail-in; bail-out; bank doom-loop; creditors; failing bank resolution; merger; recapitalisation; Abstracts; Banking; Corporate acquisitions; Economics; Educational institutions; Finance; History;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Computational Intelligence for Financial Engineering & Economics (CIFEr), 2104 IEEE Conference on
  • Conference_Location
    London
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CIFEr.2014.6924045
  • Filename
    6924045