DocumentCode :
1230232
Title :
Temperature Attacks
Author :
Brouchier, JUlien ; Kean, Tom ; Marsh, Carol ; Naccache, David
Volume :
7
Issue :
2
fYear :
2009
Firstpage :
79
Lastpage :
82
Abstract :
Confining a program during its execution so that it can´t leak information to other programs is an old concern. Recently, several researchers succeeded in fingerprinting distant machines by measuring temperature side effects on clocks. But can temperature also leak secrets in a computer or a chip? We started by implementing a covert channel between two processes (a sender and a receiver) running on the same machine. Producing heat is simple: all the sender must do is launch massive calculations. To sense temperature in the machine, we considered three options: fan-based solutions, built-in sensors; and faults as heat detectors.
Keywords :
temperature sensors; built-in sensors; covert channel; distant machines; fan-based solutions; fingerprinting; heat detectors; machine temperature sensing; program confining; temperature attacks; temperature side effects; Circuit synthesis; Control systems; Cryptography; Field programmable gate arrays; Privacy; Process control; Protection; Security; Temperature; Tuning; attack; covert channel; crypto corner; heat; information leakage; side channel; temperature;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Security & Privacy, IEEE
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1540-7993
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/MSP.2009.54
Filename :
4812164
Link To Document :
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