DocumentCode :
1233001
Title :
Scantegrity: End-to-End Voter-Verifiable Optical- Scan Voting
Author :
Chaum, David ; Essex, Aleks ; Carback, Richard ; Clark, Jeremy ; Popoveniuc, Stefan ; Sherman, Alan ; Vora, Poorvi
Author_Institution :
Univ. of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON
Volume :
6
Issue :
3
fYear :
2008
Firstpage :
40
Lastpage :
46
Abstract :
Scantegrity is a security enhancement for optical scan voting systems. It\´s part of an emerging class of "end-to-end" independent election verification systems that permit each voter to verify that his or her ballot was correctly recorded and counted. On the Scantegrity ballot, each candidate position is paired with a random letter. Election officials confirm receipt of the ballot by posting the letter that is adjacent to the marked position. Scantegrity is the first voting system to offer strong independent verification without changing the way voters mark optical scan ballots, and it complies with legislative proposals requiring "unencrypted" paper audit records.
Keywords :
formal verification; government data processing; politics; Scantegrity ballot; end-to-end independent election verification systems; end-to-end voter-verifiable optical-scan voting; security enhancement; Cryptography; Electronic components; Electronic voting; Electronic voting systems; Nominations and elections; Open systems; Optical scan voting systems; Proposals; Security; Switches; David Chaum; e-voting; election procedures; electronic voting; optical scan ballots; security;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Security & Privacy, IEEE
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1540-7993
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/MSP.2008.70
Filename :
4530398
Link To Document :
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