• DocumentCode
    1255081
  • Title

    Linearly weak keys of RC5 [private-key cipher]

  • Author

    Heys, Howard M.

  • Author_Institution
    Fac. of Eng. & Appl. Sci., Memorial Univ. of Newfoundland, St. John´s, Nfld.
  • Volume
    33
  • Issue
    10
  • fYear
    1997
  • fDate
    5/8/1997 12:00:00 AM
  • Firstpage
    836
  • Lastpage
    838
  • Abstract
    The author examines the application of linear cryptanalysis to the RC5 private-key cipher and shows that there are expected to be weak keys for which the attack is applicable to many rounds. It is demonstrated that, for the 12-round nominal RC5 version with a 64 bit block size and a 128 bit key, there are 228 weak keys for which only ~217 known plaintexts are required to break the cipher. There are 268 keys for which the cipher is theoretically breakable, requiring ~257 known plaintexts. The analysis highlights the sensitivity of RC5 security to its key scheduling algorithm
  • Keywords
    cryptography; probability; scheduling; RC5 private-key cipher; RC5 security; cipher attack; key scheduling algorithm; linear cryptanalysis; linearly weak keys; plaintexts;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Electronics Letters
  • Publisher
    iet
  • ISSN
    0013-5194
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1049/el:19970601
  • Filename
    592573