DocumentCode :
1309707
Title :
Analyzing a Family of Key Protection Schemes against Modification Attacks
Author :
Li, Tieyan ; Wang, Guilin
Author_Institution :
Irdeto Access Technol. (Beijing) Co. Ltd., Beijing, China
Volume :
8
Issue :
5
fYear :
2011
Firstpage :
770
Lastpage :
776
Abstract :
Protecting cryptographic keys in hardware devices is challenging. In this work, we reinvestigate a family of key protection schemes proposed by Fung, Golin and Gray (2001), which use permutations to protect keys stored in Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM). Our analysis discovers vulnerabilities in the use of mathematical permutations. Specifically, we successfully identify two practical attacks-batch card attack and relative probing attack-which allow an adversary to discover the secret key stored in the EEPROM. Contrary to the claims of Fung et al., these attacks are realizable with a relatively small number of probes. Moreover, we examine the rationale of their security assumptions, which are mainly based on the modification attack described by Anderson and Kuhn (1997), and conclude that recent advances in hardware security (w.r.t. both attacks and countermeasures) suggest a stronger adversary model on designing such secure devices.
Keywords :
EPROM; cryptography; batch card attack; cryptographic keys; electrically erasable programmable read-only memory; hardware devices; key protection schemes; mathematical permutations; modification attacks; relative probing attack; Cryptography; Decoding; EPROM; Hardware; Probes; Wiring; Secret protection; hardware security.; modification attack; permutation;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Dependable and Secure Computing, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1545-5971
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/TDSC.2010.44
Filename :
5560679
Link To Document :
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