• DocumentCode
    1334395
  • Title

    New Fault-Based Side-Channel Attack Using Fault Sensitivity

  • Author

    Li, Yang ; Ohta, Kazuo ; Sakiyama, Kazuo

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Inf., Univ. of Electro-Commun., Chofu, Japan
  • Volume
    7
  • Issue
    1
  • fYear
    2012
  • Firstpage
    88
  • Lastpage
    97
  • Abstract
    This paper proposes a new fault-based attack called fault sensitivity analysis (FSA) attack. In the FSA attack, fault injections are used to test out the sensitive information leakage called fault sensitivity. Fault sensitivity means the critical fault injection intensity that corresponds to the threshold between devices´ normal and abnormal behaviors. We demonstrate that without using the values of the faulty outputs, attackers can obtain the information of the secret key based on the data-dependency of the collected fault sensitivity data. This paper explains the successful FSA attacks against three Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) hardware implementations, where two of them are resistant to the differential fault analysis. This paper also discusses the countermeasures against the proposed FSA attacks.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; FSA attack; advanced encryption standard hardware implementations; data-dependency; differential fault analysis; fault injection intensity; fault sensitivity analysis; fault-based side-channel attack; secret key; sensitive information leakage; Circuit faults; Clocks; Delay; Doped fiber amplifiers; Logic gates; Sensitivity; Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); countermeasures; fault attack; fault sensitivity analysis (FSA);
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1556-6013
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/TIFS.2011.2169666
  • Filename
    6029422