DocumentCode :
1361315
Title :
Exploiting Spectrum Heterogeneity in Dynamic Spectrum Market
Author :
Min, Alexander W. ; Zhang, Xinyu ; Choi, Jaehyuk ; Shin, Kang G.
Author_Institution :
Circuits & Syst. Res./Syst. Archit. Lab, Intel Labs., Hillsboro, OR, USA
Volume :
11
Issue :
12
fYear :
2012
Firstpage :
2020
Lastpage :
2032
Abstract :
The dynamic spectrum market (DSM) is a key economic vehicle for realizing the opportunistic spectrum access that will mitigate the anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem. DSM allows legacy spectrum owners to lease their channels to unlicensed spectrum consumers (or secondary users) in order to increase their revenue and improve spectrum utilization. In DSM, determining the optimal spectrum leasing price is an important yet challenging problem that requires a comprehensive understanding of market participants´ interests and interactions. In this paper, we study spectrum pricing competition in a duopoly DSM, where two wireless service providers (WSPs) lease spectrum access rights, and secondary users (SUs) purchase the spectrum use to maximize their utility. We identify two essential, but previously overlooked, properties of DSM: 1) heterogeneous spectrum resources at WSPs and 2) spectrum sharing among SUs. We demonstrate the impact of spectrum heterogeneity via an in-depth measurement study using a software-defined radio (SDR) testbed. We then study the impacts of spectrum heterogeneity on WSPs´ optimal pricing and SUs´ WSP selection strategies using a systematic three-step approach. First, we study how spectrum sharing among SUs subscribed to the same WSP affects the SUs´ achievable utility. Then, we derive the SUs´ optimal WSP selection strategy that maximizes their payoff, given the heterogeneous spectrum propagation characteristics and prices. We analyze how individual SU preferences affect market evolution and prove the market convergence to a mean-field limit, even though SUs make local decisions. Finally, given the market evolution, we formulate the WSPs´ pricing strategies in a duopoly DSM as a noncooperative game and identify its Nash equilibrium points. We find that the equilibrium price and its uniqueness depend on the SUs´ geographical density and spectrum propagation characteristics. Our analytical framework reveals the impact of spectrum heteroge- eity in a real-world DSM, and can be used as a guideline for the WSPs´ pricing strategies.
Keywords :
cognitive radio; game theory; pricing; software radio; DSM; Nash equilibrium points; SDR testbed; SU WSP selection strategy; SU geographical density; WSP optimal pricing strategy; anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem; dynamic spectrum market; equilibrium price; heterogeneous spectrum resources; in-depth measurement study; mean-field limit; noncooperative game; opportunistic spectrum access; optimal WSP selection strategy; optimal spectrum leasing price; software-defined radio; spectrum heterogeneity; spectrum pricing competition; spectrum propagation characteristics; spectrum sharing; spectrum utilization; systematic three-step approach; wireless service providers; Frequency measurement; Interference; Pricing; Radio spectrum management; Receivers; Signal to noise ratio; Wireless communication; Cognitive radios; dynamic spectrum market; game theory; spectrum heterogeneity; spectrum pricing;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1536-1233
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/TMC.2011.229
Filename :
6060827
Link To Document :
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