DocumentCode :
1384119
Title :
Security and Interoperable-Medical-Device Systems, Part 2: Failures, Consequences, and Classification
Author :
Vasserman, Eugene Y. ; Venkatasubramanian, Krishna K. ; Sokolsky, Oleg ; Lee, Insup
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Comput. & Inf. Sci., Kansas State Univ.´´s, KS, USA
Volume :
10
Issue :
6
fYear :
2012
Firstpage :
70
Lastpage :
73
Abstract :
Interoperable medical devices (IMDs) face threats due to the increased attack surface presented by interoperability and the corresponding infrastructure. Introducing networking and coordination functionalities fundamentally alters medical systems´ security properties. Understanding the threats is an important first step in eventually designing security solutions for such systems. Part 2 of this two-part article defines a failure model, or the specific ways in which IMD environments might fail when attacked. An attack-consequences model expresses the combination of failures experienced by IMD environments for each attack vector. This analysis leads to interesting conclusions about regulatory classes of medical devices in IMD environments subject to attacks. Part 1 can be found here: http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/MSP.2012.128.
Keywords :
medical computing; open systems; security of data; system recovery; IMD environment; attack surface; attack vector; attack-consequence model; coordination functionality; failure model; interoperability; interoperable-medical-device system; medical system security property; networking functionality; regulatory class; security solution design; threat understanding; Biomedical equipment; Computer security; Failure analysis; Interoperability; Medical services; ICE; IMD; Integrated Clinical Environment; attack model; attack vectors; computer security; interoperability; interoperable medical devices; medical devices;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Security & Privacy, IEEE
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1540-7993
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/MSP.2012.153
Filename :
6375721
Link To Document :
بازگشت