DocumentCode
138881
Title
Compensations in weak renegotiation proof equilibria
Author
Yuankan Huang ; Inohara, Takehiro
Author_Institution
Dept. of Value & Decision Sci., Tokyo Inst. of Technol., Tokyo, Japan
fYear
2014
fDate
25-27 June 2014
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
5
Abstract
In an infinitely repeated game, after a player deviated from promised plays, if he can compensate for his opponent for a number of periods, then after the compensations, their interaction can return to the original state before the deviation. If we name such compensation as agreement, then such agreement can be modeled by weak renegotiation proof equilibrium. In this research, we discuss such equilibrium and introduce main approaches and possible applications regarding it.
Keywords
game theory; social sciences; agreement; compensations; folk theorem; infinitely repeated game; weak renegotiation proof equilibria; Automata; Contracts; Educational institutions; Games; History; Monitoring; Vectors; folk theorem; infinitely repeated game; weak renegotiation proof equilibrium;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM), 2014 11th International Conference on
Conference_Location
Beijing
Print_ISBN
978-1-4799-3133-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/ICSSSM.2014.6943391
Filename
6943391
Link To Document