• DocumentCode
    1389991
  • Title

    An auctioning mechanism for green radio

  • Author

    Comaniciu, Cristina ; Mandayam, Narayan B. ; Poor, H. Vincent ; Gorce, Jean-Marie

  • Author_Institution
    ECE Department, Stevens Institute of Technology, USA
  • Volume
    12
  • Issue
    2
  • fYear
    2010
  • fDate
    4/1/2010 12:00:00 AM
  • Firstpage
    114
  • Lastpage
    121
  • Abstract
    In this paper, an auctioning strategy is proposed for cellular networks that ensures net energy savings. The pricing scheme, in conjunction with a two dimensional bid structure, incentivizes cooperation at the terminal nodes for better interference management at receivers and for cooperative relaying. It is shown that, for the proposed auctioning strategy, network operators are guaranteed revenue gains, mobile nodes´ dominant strategy is to bid their true valuation of their energy resources, and overall effective energy gains occur under the assumption of a reserve price for bidding. Simulation results show that significant energy savings can be achieved by employing this auctioning mechanism for a 3G cellular set-up.
  • Keywords
    Cellular; Vickrey auction; cooperative relaying; green radio; interference management; pricing;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Communications and Networks, Journal of
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1229-2370
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/JCN.2010.6391367
  • Filename
    6391367