DocumentCode :
1392119
Title :
Cryptanalysis of reduced versions of the Camellia block cipher
Author :
Lu, Jun ; Wei, Y. ; Fouque, P.A. ; Kim, Jung-Ho
Author_Institution :
Agency for Sci., Technol. & Res., Inst. for Infocomm Res., Singapore, Singapore
Volume :
6
Issue :
3
fYear :
2012
Firstpage :
228
Lastpage :
238
Abstract :
The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length, a user key 128, 192 or 256 bits long and a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European new European schemes for signatures, integrity and encryption (NESSIE) selected cipher and an ISO international standard. In this study, the authors describe a flaw in the approach used to choose plaintexts or ciphertexts in certain previously published square-like cryptanalytic results for Camellia and give two possible approaches to correct them. Finally, by taking advantage of the early abort technique and a few observations on the key schedule of Camellia, the authors present impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits, 14-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits.
Keywords :
cryptography; government data processing; recommender systems; Camellia block cipher; European schemes; ISO international standard; Japanese CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher; ciphertexts; cryptanalysis; differential attacks; plaintexts; reduced versions; square like cryptanalytic results;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Information Security, IET
Publisher :
iet
ISSN :
1751-8709
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1049/iet-ifs.2011.0342
Filename :
6397168
Link To Document :
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