• DocumentCode
    1392119
  • Title

    Cryptanalysis of reduced versions of the Camellia block cipher

  • Author

    Lu, Jun ; Wei, Y. ; Fouque, P.A. ; Kim, Jung-Ho

  • Author_Institution
    Agency for Sci., Technol. & Res., Inst. for Infocomm Res., Singapore, Singapore
  • Volume
    6
  • Issue
    3
  • fYear
    2012
  • Firstpage
    228
  • Lastpage
    238
  • Abstract
    The Camellia block cipher has a 128-bit block length, a user key 128, 192 or 256 bits long and a total of 18 rounds for a 128-bit key and 24 rounds for a 192 or 256-bit key. It is a Japanese CRYPTREC-recommended e-government cipher, a European new European schemes for signatures, integrity and encryption (NESSIE) selected cipher and an ISO international standard. In this study, the authors describe a flaw in the approach used to choose plaintexts or ciphertexts in certain previously published square-like cryptanalytic results for Camellia and give two possible approaches to correct them. Finally, by taking advantage of the early abort technique and a few observations on the key schedule of Camellia, the authors present impossible differential attacks on 10-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 128 key bits, 11-round Camellia with the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits, 14-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 192 key bits and 16-round Camellia without the FL/FL-1 functions under 256 key bits.
  • Keywords
    cryptography; government data processing; recommender systems; Camellia block cipher; European schemes; ISO international standard; Japanese CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher; ciphertexts; cryptanalysis; differential attacks; plaintexts; reduced versions; square like cryptanalytic results;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Information Security, IET
  • Publisher
    iet
  • ISSN
    1751-8709
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1049/iet-ifs.2011.0342
  • Filename
    6397168