DocumentCode :
13976
Title :
Oligopolistic Generation Expansion:A Multi-leader Multi-follower approach
Author :
Avila, R.T. ; Behnke, R.P.
Author_Institution :
Univ. de Chile, Santiago, Chile
Volume :
11
Issue :
4
fYear :
2013
fDate :
Jun-13
Firstpage :
1029
Lastpage :
1035
Abstract :
In this paper a novel analysis of competitive generation expansion under imperfections such as indivisibility of projects, risk aversion and oligopolies investing strategically is proposed. Based on the game theory, the oligopoly is modeled as a group of leader companies, with the first option to invest, facing potential new investors to enter the market. The approach can be seen as an extension of the Stackelberg game to a multi-leader case. A solution procedure is developed, which combines equilibrium search algorithms for non-strategic and Nash in matrix games. An application example with a representation of the Chilean power system shows the viability of the methodology. The simulations suggest that the market power of the oligopoly depends on its ability to control the most profitable expansion technologies and the possibility that new investors decide to enter into the market. This kind of results can assist the analysis of imperfect-competitive generation expansion in real systems.
Keywords :
game theory; matrix algebra; oligopoly; power markets; risk analysis; search problems; Chilean power system; Nash games; Stackelberg game; competitive generation expansion; equilibrium search algorithms; game theory; leaders companies; matrix games; multileader multifollower approach; oligopolistic generation expansion; profitable expansion technologies; real systems; risk aversion; Computational modeling; Game theory; Games; Media; Oligopoly; Silicon; Vectors; Game theory; Pool; capacity payments; competitive generation expansion; market design;
fLanguage :
English
Journal_Title :
Latin America Transactions, IEEE (Revista IEEE America Latina)
Publisher :
ieee
ISSN :
1548-0992
Type :
jour
DOI :
10.1109/TLA.2013.6601746
Filename :
6601746
Link To Document :
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