LOTUS: Location-aware online truthful double auction for dynamic spectrum access

In dynamic spectrum auction, if a buyer locates in a “critical” place, interfering with many other buyers, its occupancy of the spectrum may deprive many others the transmission opportunity. In this paper, we for the first time propose a location-aware online double auction mechanism, LOTUS. The biggest challenge is: the spectrum requests are sporadic, an interference-harmful buyer may request spectrum earlier than others, making it difficult to decide whether to grant its spectrum request instantly. To address the challenge, we considers the opportunity cost of the spectrum allocation regarding location-based interference conditions. We introduce the “interference discount” to characterize the interference harmfulness. The simulation results show that LOTUS can improve buyers´ utility by more than 110% over the static auction, and 25% over the online auction without considering interference discount. The spectrum utilization is enhanced by 120% over static auction, and 65.3% over the online auction without considering interference discount.