Title :
Cryptanalysis of Two Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols
Author_Institution :
Div. of Fusion & Convergence of Math. Sci., Nat. Inst. for Math. Sci., Daejeon, South Korea
fDate :
4/1/2012 12:00:00 AM
Abstract :
The identity-based infrastructure introduced by Shamir allows a user´s public key to be easily derivable from her known identity information such as an email address or a cellular phone number. Such cryptosystems alleviate the certificate overhead and solve the problems of PKI technology. In this letter, we show that two identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols proposed by Holbl and Welzer are completely broken.
Keywords :
cryptographic protocols; message authentication; public key cryptography; PKI technology; cellular phone number; certificate overhead; cryptanalysis; cryptosystem; email address; identity information; identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol; identity-based infrastructure; public key; Adaptation models; Authentication; Protocols; Public key; Resilience; Identity-based system; authenticated key agreement protocol; implicit key authentication; man-in-the-middle attack;
Journal_Title :
Communications Letters, IEEE
DOI :
10.1109/LCOMM.2012.022112.112421
