• DocumentCode
    1458392
  • Title

    Deterring Strategic Cyberattack

  • Author

    Elliott, D.

  • Volume
    9
  • Issue
    5
  • fYear
    2011
  • Firstpage
    36
  • Lastpage
    40
  • Abstract
    Protecting critical infrastructure from cyberattacks by other nations is a matter of considerable concern. Can deterrence play a role in such protection? Can lessons from nuclear deterrence-the most elaborated and successful version of deterrence-be adapted to the cyber case? Currently, little overlap exists between the two, although that might change in the aftermath of an extensive, destructive cyberattack. The most effective way to protect the cyber-dependent infrastructure is a comprehensive defense (deterrence by denial), which was impractical in the nuclear regime. However, this approach presents challenges. Existing legal norms, particularly those related to controlling collateral damage, might provide some deterrence. Another option might be a new international agreement, but that would involve several difficult issues.
  • Keywords
    critical infrastructures; security of data; collateral damage control; comprehensive defense; critical infrastructure protection; cyber-dependent infrastructure; cyberattack; international agreement; legal norm; nuclear deterrence; nuclear regime; Computer crime; Cyberspace; Government policies; Privacy; cyber security; cyberattack deterrence; cyberwar; nuclear deterrence versus cyber deterrence;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Security & Privacy, IEEE
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    1540-7993
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/MSP.2011.24
  • Filename
    5719592