• DocumentCode
    1479792
  • Title

    Cognitive radio games

  • Author

    Liu, K.J.R.

  • Author_Institution
    University of Maryland
  • Volume
    48
  • Issue
    4
  • fYear
    2011
  • fDate
    4/1/2011 12:00:00 AM
  • Firstpage
    40
  • Lastpage
    56
  • Abstract
    As our radios get smarter, they\´ll be competing for over-crowded airwaves. Game theory can make them cooperate. The cognitive-radio game the author sketched here is admittedly an idealization. Things rapidly become more complicated when you consider more realistic spectrum-sharing situations. For some frequency bands, for example, a primary licensee will be involved, in which case you need to figure in the value of the payments secondary users must make to the "owner" of the spectrum (or even to one another) in determining their motivations. Also, real cognitive radios are able to adjust in more ways than just by switching their transmissions on or off. They can be required to limit the amount of power they use to transmit or to shift to a protocol that sends less data but produces less interference for others. The variations are nearly endless.
  • Keywords
    cognitive radio; game theory; protocols; radiofrequency interference; cognitive-radio games; game theory; interference; over-crowded airwaves; primary licensee; protocol; secondary users; spectrum-sharing situations; Cognitive radio; Economics; Electromagnetic interference; Game theory; IEEE 802.11 Standards; Radio communication; Wireless communication;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Journal_Title
    Spectrum, IEEE
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • ISSN
    0018-9235
  • Type

    jour

  • DOI
    10.1109/MSPEC.2011.5738398
  • Filename
    5738398