An Information Secrecy Game in Cognitive Radio Networks

Although cognitive radio technology improves efficiency of spectrum utilization, primary users usually do not gain from opening up the spectrum in the opportunistic spectrum access, and sometimes even suffer from collisions due to secondary users´ imperfect spectrum sensing. However, in this paper, we show that if information secrecy is a concern, primary users could actually be better off by allowing secondary users to cooperatively share the spectrum. Specifically, we propose a new cooperation paradigm in cognitive radio networks that primary users improve secrecy with the help of trustworthy secondary users, in the presence of an intelligent and passive eavesdropper attempting to decode primary users´ messages. After deriving the achievable pair of primary users´ secrecy rate and secondary users´ transmission rate under various circumstances, we model the interaction between primary users and secondary users as a Stackelberg game in which transmission power levels are the key to maximize data rates. Moreover, based on a 2-D representation of how achievable rates depend on power-level regions, we apply equilibrium analysis to understand the optimal strategy of primary and secondary users. Finally, simulation results are presented to verify the performance.