DocumentCode
153547
Title
Analyzing Forged SSL Certificates in the Wild
Author
Lin Shung Huang ; Rice, Alex ; Ellingsen, Erling ; Jackson, Collin
Author_Institution
Carnegie Mellon Univ., Pittsburgh, PA, USA
fYear
2014
fDate
18-21 May 2014
Firstpage
83
Lastpage
97
Abstract
The SSL man-in-the-middle attack uses forged SSL certificates to intercept encrypted connections between clients and servers. However, due to a lack of reliable indicators, it is still unclear how commonplace these attacks occur in the wild. In this work, we have designed and implemented a method to detect the occurrence of SSL man-in-the-middle attack on a top global website, Facebook. Over 3 million real-world SSL connections to this website were analyzed. Our results indicate that 0.2% of the SSL connections analyzed were tampered with forged SSL certificates, most of them related to antivirus software and corporate-scale content filters. We have also identified some SSL connections intercepted by malware. Limitations of the method and possible defenses to such attacks are also discussed.
Keywords
certification; security of data; Facebook; SSL man-in-the-middle attack; antivirus software; corporate-scale content filters; encrypted connections; forged SSL certificate analysis; global Web site; secure socket layer; Browsers; Cryptography; Java; Protocols; Servers; Sockets; SSL; certificates; man-in-the-middle attack;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on
Conference_Location
San Jose, CA
ISSN
1081-6011
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/SP.2014.13
Filename
6956558
Link To Document