• DocumentCode
    153565
  • Title

    Upgrading Your Android, Elevating My Malware: Privilege Escalation through Mobile OS Updating

  • Author

    Luyi Xing ; Xiaorui Pan ; Rui Wang ; Kan Yuan ; Xiaofeng Wang

  • fYear
    2014
  • fDate
    18-21 May 2014
  • Firstpage
    393
  • Lastpage
    408
  • Abstract
    Android is a fast evolving system, with new updates coming out one after another. These updates often completely overhaul a running system, replacing and adding tens of thousands of files across Android´s complex architecture, in the presence of critical user data and applications (apps for short). To avoid accidental damages to such data and existing apps, the upgrade process involves complicated program logic, whose security implications, however, are less known. In this paper, we report the first systematic study on the Android updating mechanism, focusing on its Package Management Service (PMS). Our research brought to light a new type of security-critical vulnerabilities, called Pileup flaws, through which a malicious app can strategically declare a set of privileges and attributes on a low-version operating system (OS) and wait until it is upgraded to escalate its privileges on the new system. Specifically, we found that by exploiting the Pileup vulnerabilities, the app can not only acquire a set of newly added system and signature permissions but also determine their settings (e.g., protection levels), and it can further substitute for new system apps, contaminate their data (e.g., cache, cookies of Android default browser) to steal sensitive user information or change security configurations, and prevent installation of critical system services. We systematically analyzed the source code of PMS using a program verification tool and confirmed the presence of those security flaws on all Android official versions and over 3000 customized versions. Our research also identified hundreds of exploit opportunities the adversary can leverage over thousands of devices across different device manufacturers, carriers and countries. To mitigate this threat without endangering user data and apps during an upgrade, we also developed a new detection service, called SecUP, which deploys a scanner on the user´s device to capture the malicious apps designed to exploit Pileu- vulnerabilities, based upon the vulnerability-related information automatically collected from newly released Android OS images.
  • Keywords
    Android (operating system); formal verification; invasive software; mobile computing; Android OS images; PMS; Pileup flaws; low-version operating system; malicious apps; malware; mobile OS updating; operating systems; package management service; program verification tool; security configuration; security-critical vulnerability; user information; Androids; Google; Humanoid robots; Mobile communication; Registers; Security; Smart phones; Android; OS update; Package Manager Service; Privilege Escalation;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Security and Privacy (SP), 2014 IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    San Jose, CA
  • ISSN
    1081-6011
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/SP.2014.32
  • Filename
    6956577