Title :
The Weird Machines in Proof-Carrying Code
Author_Institution :
Bloomberg L.P., New York, NY, USA
Abstract :
We review different attack vectors on Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) related to policy, memory model, machine abstraction, and formal system. We capture the notion of weird machines in PCC to formalize the shadow execution arising in programs when their proofs do not sufficiently capture and disallow the execution of untrusted computations. We suggest a few ideas to improve existing PCC systems so they are more resilient to memory attacks.
Keywords :
codes; security of data; PCC systems; formal system; machine abstraction; memory attacks; memory model; proof-carrying code; untrusted computations; weird machines; Abstracts; Computational modeling; Program processors; Registers; Safety; Security; Semantics; FPCC; Machines; PCC; Weird;
Conference_Titel :
Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW), 2014 IEEE
Conference_Location :
San Jose, CA
DOI :
10.1109/SPW.2014.37
