Title :
Measuring and managing unilateral market power in electricity
Author_Institution :
Dept. of Econ., Stanford Univ., Palo Alto, CA, USA
Abstract :
Summary form only given. The past two decades of international experience with wholesale electricity markets has demonstrated that significant consumer harm can result from firms simply engaging in unilateral profit-maximizing behavior given the actions of their competitors. Different from other product markets, coordinated actions among suppliers or the concentration of production capacity in the hands of small number of firms is unnecessary for electricity suppliers to be able to raise prices substantially above competitive levels. This talk presents settlement period-level measures of the inverse of the elasticity of residual demand curve, 1/εhj, possessed by a collection of large suppliers the California, Australian and Colombia wholesale electricity markets. These markets differ along a number of dimensions.
Keywords :
power markets; power system economics; pricing; Australian wholesale electricity markets; California wholesale electricity markets; Colombia wholesale electricity markets; electricity; electricity suppliers; residual demand curve; settlement period-level measures; unilateral market power; unilateral profit-maximizing behavior; Costs; Elasticity; Electric variables measurement; Electricity supply industry; Energy management; Load management; Power generation; Power measurement; Power supplies; Production;
Conference_Titel :
Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2005. IEEE
Print_ISBN :
0-7803-9157-8
DOI :
10.1109/PES.2005.1489729