• DocumentCode
    1594373
  • Title

    Elections Can be Manipulated Often

  • Author

    Friedgut, Ehud ; Kalai, Gil ; Nisan, Noam

  • Author_Institution
    Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, Jerusalem
  • fYear
    2008
  • Firstpage
    243
  • Lastpage
    249
  • Abstract
    The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial voting method among at least 3 alternatives can be strategically manipulated. We prove a quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
  • Keywords
    government data processing; random processes; Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; neutral voting method; nontrivial voting method; random manipulation; Aggregates; Computer science; Gas insulated transmission lines; Nominations and elections; Voting; Computational game theory; elections; social choice;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Foundations of Computer Science, 2008. FOCS '08. IEEE 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on
  • Conference_Location
    Philadelphia, PA
  • ISSN
    0272-5428
  • Print_ISBN
    978-0-7695-3436-7
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/FOCS.2008.87
  • Filename
    4690958
    • Link To Document
    https://search.isc.ac/dl/search/defaultta.aspx?DTC=49&DC=1594373