• DocumentCode
    1609095
  • Title

    Cross-Site Request Forgery: Attack and Defense

  • Author

    Alexenko, Tatiana ; Jenne, Mark ; Roy, Suman Deb ; Zeng, Wenjun

  • Author_Institution
    Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
  • fYear
    2010
  • Firstpage
    1
  • Lastpage
    2
  • Abstract
    Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) has emerged as a potent threat to Web 2.0 applications. Because of the stateless nature of the HTTP protocol, a malicious Website can force the user´s browser to send unauthorized requests to a trusted site. This demo provides hands on exposure of the various ways in which some popular Web applications are exploited using CSRF, in addition to demonstrating techniques by which CSRF signatures can be detected and attacks effectively resisted even before initiation. The user needs only to install a simple extension to get notified about potential CSRF vulnerabilities. Because validating the Referer Header is a common CSRF prevention method, a novel solution to the Referer Privacy issue will also be demonstrated.
  • Keywords
    Internet; digital signatures; CSRF prevention method; CSRF signatures; CSRF vulnerabilities; HTTP protocol; Web 2.0 applications; cross-site request forgery; malicious website; referer header validation; referer privacy issue; Application software; Communications Society; Computer science; Forgery; Paper technology; Privacy; Protocols; Social network services; Software engineering; Uniform resource locators;
  • fLanguage
    English
  • Publisher
    ieee
  • Conference_Titel
    Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2010 7th IEEE
  • Conference_Location
    Las Vegas, NV
  • Print_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5175-3
  • Electronic_ISBN
    978-1-4244-5176-0
  • Type

    conf

  • DOI
    10.1109/CCNC.2010.5421782
  • Filename
    5421782