DocumentCode
1609095
Title
Cross-Site Request Forgery: Attack and Defense
Author
Alexenko, Tatiana ; Jenne, Mark ; Roy, Suman Deb ; Zeng, Wenjun
Author_Institution
Dept. of Comput. Sci., Univ. of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA
fYear
2010
Firstpage
1
Lastpage
2
Abstract
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) has emerged as a potent threat to Web 2.0 applications. Because of the stateless nature of the HTTP protocol, a malicious Website can force the user´s browser to send unauthorized requests to a trusted site. This demo provides hands on exposure of the various ways in which some popular Web applications are exploited using CSRF, in addition to demonstrating techniques by which CSRF signatures can be detected and attacks effectively resisted even before initiation. The user needs only to install a simple extension to get notified about potential CSRF vulnerabilities. Because validating the Referer Header is a common CSRF prevention method, a novel solution to the Referer Privacy issue will also be demonstrated.
Keywords
Internet; digital signatures; CSRF prevention method; CSRF signatures; CSRF vulnerabilities; HTTP protocol; Web 2.0 applications; cross-site request forgery; malicious website; referer header validation; referer privacy issue; Application software; Communications Society; Computer science; Forgery; Paper technology; Privacy; Protocols; Social network services; Software engineering; Uniform resource locators;
fLanguage
English
Publisher
ieee
Conference_Titel
Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC), 2010 7th IEEE
Conference_Location
Las Vegas, NV
Print_ISBN
978-1-4244-5175-3
Electronic_ISBN
978-1-4244-5176-0
Type
conf
DOI
10.1109/CCNC.2010.5421782
Filename
5421782
Link To Document